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Abstract—The last five years have produced many reports 
and guidance on how mining should occur to better balance its 
broader benefits and impacts. There are copious 
recommendations for government regulation and also for 
responsible company conduct. This article summarises the main 
documents here, together with broader dynamics in government 
regulation, and identifies some lessons these may provide for 
mining regulation in Indonesia. This includes local content, 
human rights, and governance. 
Keywords — mining, regulation, Indonesia, local content, 
regulatory impact assessment, human rights 
This paper summarises recent studies and 
recommendations about how governments should regulate 
mining, and identifies some aspects of particular relevance to 
Indonesia. This is presented under four headings . 
(I) International trends,  
(II) Indonesia-specific materials,  
(III) Broader regulatory dynamics, and  
(IV) Concluding observations. 
I. INTERNATIONAL ‘TRENDS’ 
The last decade has seen a vast amount of publications 
suggesting how states should regulate mining. The following 
is a form of ‘literature review’ of the more relevant material. 
Each work is given one sentence summary, followed by a 
description of its production/authorship, and then a brief 
outline of its contents or analysis. This should be read with the 
caveat that these materials do not present a summary or 
‘average’ of what currently exists in countries with extensive 
mining. Much of the following is aspirational in outlining why 
and how improvements should occur in countries’ mining 
regulation. Such recommendations are easily made at the 
international or academic level because those authors do not 
have to actually implement that regulatory regime, nor 
manage competing interests. Nevertheless, international 
guidance and standards do provide a useful measure and ideas 
for improvements in domestic mining regulation. 
A. Open Contracting (2018) [1] 
This recommends governments need to ‘improve 
transparency across the entire process by which they 
award extractive rights... [including] all stages of ... 
planning, allocation and award of rights, and information 
about contract terms and their implementation’([1], p3). 
The report arises from joint research of the Open Contracting 
Partnership and Natural Resource Governance Institute 
(NRGI). The original research for was work they conducted 
for Mexico’s National Hydrocarbons Commission about best 
practices for transparency in contract management. This was 
expanded with interviews with practitioners and researchers 
from nine countries of varying extractive-intensivity and 
economic development, and also reviewing data from NRGI’s  
‘Resource Governance Index’, and surveys of contracting 
processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, 
Myanmar, Nigeria and other countries . The report contains six 
chapters: Introduction, Overarching Issues: The System and 
The Actors Involved, Planning, Allocation and Award of 
Contracts and Licenses, Contract, and Implementation. The 
report summarises its content into the following 16 
recommendations, and usefully provides examples (and 
URLs) of various government programs which are considered 
good practice. 
1 Use joined-up information to explain the contracting 
system in full.  
2 Reconcile information needs of both companies and 
citizens.  
3 Communicate who the decision-makers are.  
4 Disclose information about the areas to be opened to 
extractive industry contracting and why.  
5 Reconcile sub-surface and surface rights and the needs of 
their users.  
6 Publicly explain the choice between different allocation 
methods and how they apply in different situations.  
7 Communicate early that allocation is happening.  
8 Publish the rules of the game.  
9 Disclose who stands to benefit.  
10 Disclose regulator engagement with prospective 
companies. 
11 Conduct and disclose consultative processes.  
12-15 Disclose allocation outcomes, contracts, investment, 
production and reserves, revenues and benefits.  
16 Track and disclose contract compliance.  
B. Local content policies: Guidance for Governments 
(2018) [2] 
This detailed Guidance (90pp) ‘aims to help 
governments in the essential task of deciding what (if any) 
local content policies are appropriate to their unique 
settings, what supporting policies and partnerships are 
needed, and how those policies can be successfully 
implemented’ ([2], p iv). The report was produced by the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining Minerals Metals and 
Sustainable Development, as a Guidance for its members and 
other governments. The contents are arranged under the 
Guidance’s main recommendation, with each chapter 
providing detailed commentary, case studies, and assistance 
on that topic. The main points are listed below. 
International Conference on Energy and Mining Law (ICEML 2018)
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3.0 Step 1: Ensuring a Fit with National Development 
Objectives 
4.0 Step 2: Taking Stock 
4.1 Understanding the Sectoral Context 
4.2 Appreciating Current Opportunities and Future 
Challenges 
4.3 Prerequisites: Other key elements of the scan 
4.4 Possible Risks of Ill-Designed Policies 
5.0 Step 3: Crafting the Policies  
5.1 Local Procurement 
5.2 Local Direct Employment 
5.3 Horizontal Linkages: Development beyond the 
mining sector 
5.4 Downstream Linkages: Beneficiation of mining 
products 
5.5 Building Domestic Capacity: Fostering national 
mining firms 
6.0 Step 4: Monitoring, Review, Enforcement 
7.0 Cross-Cutting Concerns 
7.1 The Challenge of Technological Evolution 
7.2 The Challenge of International Trade and 
Investment Law 
Chapter 5, on drafting local content policies, is the bulk of 
this report and contains useful detail on the economic and 
political considerations in relation to each of the topics it 
covers and how these may reinforce the governments 
approach and structures. 
C. Responsible Mining Index (2018) [3] 
This does not focus on government regulation of mining, 
but is instead a report on large-scale mining companies ’ 
actions on economic, environmental, social and 
governance issues across their mining activities . The 
assessment is based on publicly available information on these 
companies and mine sites, measuring both company-wide 
behaviour and also site-level actions at 127 mines. It does not 
purport to be an independent survey of each companies’ 
performance but measures the company’s commitments, 
procedures and review of its actions. The relevance for this, to 
those interested in government regulation of mining, is that it 
helps indicate what may be expected from the large-scale 
company (and thus helps inform areas for attention).1  The 
Index provides detail, against six themes (Economic 
Development, Business Conduct, Lifecycle Management, 
Community Wellbeing, Working Conditions, and 
Environmental Responsibility) for 30 companies. Of most 
interest to government regulation of mining is the Index’s ‘key 
findings’, extracted below. 
1 Responsible mining ‘can be done...[it] is a realistic goal 
...existing best practice, if systematically applied by all 
companies, could already go some way to meeting society 
expectations.  
2 [There is a] Diversity of responsible practice 
...performance does not necessarily depend on the 
company size or commodity focus, the home countries 
where they are registered, or the producing countries 
where they operate. 
3 Commitments need to be realised. The vast majority of 
companies have made policy commitments on topics such 
as ... human rights, occupational health and safety, and 
                                                                 
1
  However it  is important to note the Index’s caveat that ‘RMI 
recognises, but does not attempt to measure, the influence of external 
institutions on company behaviour, such as laws and regulations 
environmental impact management ...[but] few companies 
can demonstrate that they have systematically 
operationalised their commitments into effective actions 
and fewer still show they are tracking their performance 
on these issues. ... 
5 External requirements improve public disclosure. ... 
6 From case studies to systematic action. Stronger 
performing companies generally demonstrate company-
wide approaches to managing EESG [economic, 
environmental, social and governance] issues, rather than 
only being able to show action in a specific mine site. ... 
7 Site-level data [is] largely missing ... 
8 Open data sharing [is] still evolving’ ([3], p12-13). 
D. Managing mining for sustainable development (2018)  
[4] 
This detailed sourcebook (103pp) ‘brings together 
existing knowledge, experiences and tools to help equip 
governments and communities in resource-rich countries 
... to manage mining ... consistent with their aspirations for 
sustainable development. ...[I]t is within the power of 
governments of resource-rich countries to protect people 
and the environment and to realize the benefits from 
mining, working alongside the mining industry and local 
communities’ ([4], p4). The book was produced by UN 
agencies with extensive input from government, industry and 
academic expertise and peer-review. It contains three main  
sections, after some introductory chapters on mining and 
sustainable development, covering (1) legal frameworks, (2) 
protecting the environment and people, and (3) the economic 
& developmental benefits from mining. The 
recommendations regarding these three sections are extracted 
below, and indicate the issues and assistance in the 
sourcebook. 
‘Orienting legal frameworks towards sustainable development 
 Making domestic laws and regulations coherent with each 
other and sufficiently detailed to function as the core set of 
instruments for governing mining 
 Improving coordination between government agencies and 
between national and subnational governments 
 Considering moving from contract-based regimes to law-
based regimes, avoiding using mining contracts to fill legal 
and regulatory gaps 
 Considering establishing model agreements which provide 
the policy space for environmental and social laws of the 
country, and limiting terms that are open to negotiations 
 Where mining contracts are made, paying special attention 
to provisions related to environmental impact mitigation, 
mine closure, resettlement, local content and employment 
 Ensuring transparency of mining contracts, including 
disclosure of beneficial ownership 
 Assessing implications of international investment treaties 
on the country’s commitments to sustainable development, 
human rights and the domestic policy space; negotiating 
terms in investment treaties to minimize these negative 
implications 
 Incorporating or strengthening the principles of consultation 
with local communities and free, prior and informed 
consent in domestic laws and regulations; and establishing 
established by producing country governments, conditions set  by 
investors, or frameworks and standards provided by voluntary 
initiatives’: [3], p8. 
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 59
166
or strengthening state remedy mechanisms for people 
affected by mining 
 Making use of voluntary standards developed by and for the 
mining industry, encouraging responsible mining 
investments and recognizing companies that adhere to 
strong standards 
 Recognizing and progressively registering customary land 
rights to protect poor and marginalized rural communities 
and indigenous peoples’ ([4], p4). 
‘Protecting the environment and people 
 Designing environmental regulation that adequately 
protects the environment, which also establishes clear rules 
for investors 
 Where capacities of the government and the mining 
industry allow, considering adoption of more innovative 
approaches to environmental regulation, such as 
performance-based regulation and economic incentives 
 Making requirements for EIA and EMP for the mining 
industry, setting out clear roles for the government, mining 
companies, environmental services experts, civil society 
organizations and community groups 
 Establishing laws and regulations for mine closure that 
prevent large environmental legacies and public costs 
 Ensuring that affected communities are informed in 
advance of mining projects about land use options which 
are available after mine closure 
 Investing in capacities of regulators for monitoring and 
enforcement of regulations 
 Improving intra-governmental coordination mechanisms, 
such as those between mining and environmental ministries, 
local governments, human rights commissions and other 
government agencies 
 Enhancing access to mining-related information that is 
important and relevant to local communities  
 Fostering a culture of transparency in the government and 
in the mining industry 
 Opening legal avenues for local communities and 
indigenous peoples affected by mining to have a say in 
mining projects; defining minimum standards for adequate 
consultation and consent; investing in the capacities of 
communities affected by mining; and providing access to 
remedy for people affected by mining’ ([4], p17). 
‘Realizing and enhancing the benefits from mining 
 Designing and instituting progressive fiscal regimes that 
balance between the financial returns to the country (or the 
government) and those to the mining companies, in line 
with international comparisons 
 Making use of tools such as project-level mining fiscal 
models to estimate the government ”take” from mining 
projects to design fiscal regimes and negotiate with mining 
companies 
 Ensuring that the fiscal regime is stable over time, which in 
the long term would help to move towards greater reliance 
on legal frameworks, rather than mining contracts 
 At the same time, ensuring flexibility of the fiscal regime to 
respond to the cyclical nature of the minerals and metals 
commodities markets, by building in contract negotiation 
clauses 
 Ensuring transparency of the fiscal regime (in the flows of 
resource revenues and in mining contracts) and access to 
                                                                 
2
  eg. the African Union [6] and European Commission [7]. 
3
  The difficulties of achieving agreement at an international level are 
always present and often result in rather vague statements, like the 
information, by drawing on international transparency 
initiatives such as the EITI; ensuring a relatively 
straightforward fiscal regime that does not obscure 
transparency; and fostering an overall culture of 
transparency 
 Managing the volatility of resource revenues by using tools 
such as structural budget rules developed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and designing and 
instituting natural resource funds 
 Investing resource revenues in a way that increases (or does 
not deplete) the national wealth, into infrastructure, social 
service provision, financial assets and alternative sources of 
growth, setting priorities that are consistent with the 
country’s level of development and needs 
 Using a combination of strategies to improve the 
competitiveness of domestic workers and firms and to set 
local content requirements to help enhance the benefits 
from the mining sector for employment, business 
development, and economic growth 
 Collaborating with and fostering collaboration between 
mining companies in order to design and implement local 
development initiatives, community development 
agreements and skills development initiatives 
 Supporting the capacity of local communities impacted by 
mining to take greater advantage of local development 
opportunities 
 Encouraging local development initiatives by mining 
companies to be synergized with government plans and 
programmes 
 Integrating the country’s mining sector strategies with other 
plans and policies, such as national and regional 
development plans, fiscal revenue projections and budget 
plans, macroeconomic policies, land use plans, 
infrastructure plans, public service delivery plans, human 
resource development plans and education policies ; and 
ensuring coherence between plans, policies, strategies and 
laws’ ([4], p20). 
E. Sustainable Minerals Development: Best Practices in 
ASEAN (2017) [5] 
Despite its title, this document is a summary of the 
operations of the finalists of the 1st ASEAN Mineral  
Awards, which included companies undertaking nickel 
mining in the Philippines; limestone quarrying in Thailand; 
ferronickel processing in Indonesia, and distribution of copper 
concentrates from Indonesia ([5], p1).  
ASEAN, like other regional government groupings , has 
framed some guidance about mining.2 The current version – 
the third ASEAN Minerals Cooperation Plan - was adopted in 
2015 [8], with its aim ‘to create a vibrant and competitive 
ASEAN mineral sector for the well-being of the ASEAN 
people through enhancing trade and investments and 
strengthening cooperation and capacity for sustainable 
mineral development in the region’ ([8], p1). The aim is 
commendable but the detail on how that is achieved appears 
not to be matter for regional agreement and specification.3 
While the Plan covers the following range of topics , most are 
about cooperation and exchange between ASEAN 
governments, rather than specific guidance on what those 
second ‘Objective’ of this document being that ASEAN member states 
will ‘strive... to promote environmentally and socially sustainable 
mining practices’: [8], p3-4. 
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governments should be doing in regulating mining within their 
countries. 




C. Policy Agenda and Areas of Cooperation 
D. Review of AMCAP-II 
E. Implementation Arrangements 
III. AMCAP-III Phase 1: 2016-2020 
IV. AMCAP-III Phase 2: 2021-2025 
Implementation Details of AMCAP-III Phase 1: 2016-2020 
More detailed guidance is, however, provided in 
ASEAN’s 2017 Reporting Mechanism regarding 
‘Sustainability Assessment Frameworks and Tools for the 
Minerals Sector[9]. This document ‘aims to ... track ... 
progress and long-term performance [of ASEAN Member 
States] in instituting frameworks and tools to support 
sustainability in the minerals sector’ ([9], 1). The Reporting 
Mechanism was drafted by the ‘ASEAN Senior Officials  
Meeting on Minerals’ and subsequently welcomed by 
ASEAN Ministers in November 2017 ([10], p1). So the 
contents of this Reporting Mechanism indicate what ASEAN 
considers governments should be doing to support 
sustainability in their minerals sectors. The Reporting 
Mechanism will monitor adoption and implementation  
measures, by ASEAN governments, against the following 
sustainability assessment frameworks and tools .4 
Sustainable indicators and indices, generally and also 
specific to the minerals sector (by reference to a 2004 
academic article [11]) 
Indicators of the Global Reporting Initiative (by reference 
to their 2016 standards, eg [12]) 
Indicators of the Commission on Sustainable Development 
Indicators (by reference to their 2007 edition [13]) 
Product-related sustainability assessment tools (by 
reference to a 2014 Thai Government publication [14]) 
Life cycle assessment (referencing the same Thai 
Government publication) 
Life cycle costing (by reference to a 2013 Australian 
standard [15]) 
Integrated assessment tools (by reference to a 2007 
academic article [16]) 
‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ and ‘Strategic 
Environmental Assessment’ (both by reference to a 2017 
webpage of the Irish Government [17]) 
F. Oil, Gas & Mining: Sourcebook for understanding the 
Extractive Industries (2017)  [18] 
This extensive publication (298pp) ‘illuminates the 
spectrum of integrated policy interventions necessary to 
transform natural resource wealth into sustainable 
development, ranging from the allocation of resource 
extraction rights to the use and distribution of revenues ’ 
([18], p xi). In printed form, it is the 2017 collation of a range 
of materials from a free online interactive source5 coordinated 
by the World Bank and University of Dundee’s Centre for 
Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law & Policy, of reports, 
summaries, and briefs across all parts of extractives’ 
operations and regulation. The chapters in this report provide 
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  The document says: ‘Specifically, the Reporting Mechanism will 
monitor the Sustainability and Assessment Frameworks and Tools 
adopted and/or implemented by ASEAN Member States, such as 
extensive detail on the broad economic, political and legal 
dynamics in the extractives sector, with chapter 4 of particular 
relevance to mining regulation.  
1 Shifting Patterns of Demand and Supply 
2 Extractives: Opportunities and Challenges for 
Development 
3 The Extractive Industries  
4 Policy, Legal, and Contractual Framework 
4.1 Knowledge Core 
4.2 Getting Started: Facts of EI Life 
4.3 Eight Key Challenges 
4.4 Policy Priorities 
4.5 Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws 
4.6 Contracts and Licenses 
4.7 The Award of Contracts and Licenses 
4.8 Why Regulations Are Necessary 
4.9 Investment Guarantees: Stabilization 
4.10 Contract Negotiations 
4.11 Disputes: Anticipating and Managing Them 
4.12 Summary 
4.13 Taking Action: Recommendations and Tools 
5 Sector Organization and Regulatory Institutions 
6 Fiscal Design and Administration 
7 Revenue Management and Distribution 
8 Transparency and Accountability 
9 Sustainable Development Implementation 
10 Why Governance Matters  
The summary in chapter four includes the following  
observations and guidance. 
‘Finding 1: Knowledge of the fundamentals of extractive 
industry legal and regulatory frameworks is readily 
available. ... 
Finding 2: Application of this knowledge is difficult 
because of four distinct sources of dynamism. ... 
First, and most obviously, every country context is 
unique. ... What is the right combination of established 
instruments for our particular context at this time?  
Second, legacy matters. ... Given this living legacy, how 
do new proposals manage such constraints and limit 
their impact?  
Third, adaptation will be required. ... Are formal 
mechanisms in place to allow future administrations to 
make adaptations smoothly and quickly, and is the 
capacity there to achieve this? 
Fourth, looking ahead, any choice made with respect to a 
combination of legal and regulatory instruments will 
need to be adjusted as knowledge grows and capacity 
increases. ... What mechanisms can we put in place to 
allow for flexibility without creating uncertainty for 
future investment flows? 
Finding 3: Policies are becoming increasingly differentiated 
among the segments of the extractives sector. ... 
Finding 4: Countries have progressively better defined the 
nature of subsoil rights granted and the scope of each 
stage of the entire upstream process, especially in 
hydrocarbons’[18], p106-107. 
G. Local procurement reporting mechanism (2017) [19] 
This reporting mechanism provides ‘a set of disclosures 
on local procurement...to be reported by organisations 
(Appendix I)’ ([9], p1) and these are outlined in the text above, from 
pp5-6 of that document. 
5
  http://www.eisourcebook.org (accessed 3 Aug 2018). 
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who report on mine sites...to help standardise the way the 
sector and host countries talk about these issues . It 
facilitates comprehensive reporting on local procurement 
spending at the site level, as well as practical details on mining  
company procurement processes and programmes that 
support better informed stakeholders’ ([19], 7). This aims to: 
(1) improve internal company management to create more 
benefits for host countries, (2) empower suppliers, host 
governments, and other stakeholders with practical 
information, and (3) increase transparency in the procurement 
process to deter corruption ([19], 7). The reporting 
mechanism, developed through Engineers without Borders 
Canada and Germany’s Extractives and Development 
programme, involved experience staff from industry (miners 
and suppliers), government and civil society. It also had 
extended ‘in country’ consultations in various countries  
including Mongolia. The key parts of the documents are 
indicated below. 
Part 1: Introduction to the Mining Local Procurement 
Reporting Mechanism (LPRM) 
Part 2: Disclosures on mining local procurement 
2.1- Mining LPRM reporting requirements - What is 
expected? 
2.2 -The Mining LPRM disclosures 
Context for local procurement disclosures 
Procurement systems 
Local procurement spending by category 
Local procurement due diligence 
Methods to incentivise local procurement 
External commitments and obligations 
Part 3: Institutional use of the Mining LPRM 
3.1- Host country LPRM uptake and use 
3.2- International promotion of increased mining local 
procurement through use of the Mining LPRM 
Concluding Remarks 
H. Guidance stakeholder engagement in extractives [20] 
and responsible supply chains in mining [21] (2016 & 
2017) 
These two documents , from the OECD Secretariat, outline 
guidance related to the OECD Guidelines on Multinational 
Enterprises.6 Each was finalised, over years, after exposure 
drafts and feedback (from industry, NGOs and governments) 
coordinated by the OECD Secretariat, before being accepted 
by OECD Governments. Their content is aimed at what 
companies should do, but are important for governments to be 
aware of when considering the content and form of their 
regulation. 
The 2017 guidance on stakeholder engagement ‘provides  
practical guidance to mining, oil and gas enterprises in 
addressing the challenges related to stakeholder 
engagement’ (XX, p3). This addresses both corporate 
management and also ‘on the ground’ personnel, and also 
includes recommendations for specific subjects and areas in 
the annexures. Its contents include the following. 
Due diligence framework  
Recommendations for corporate planning or to management 
Positioning stakeholder engagement strategically 
Recommendations to on-the-ground personnel 
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  Which are explained in section IIIC of this article. 
Step 1: Ensuring that personnel leading stakeholder 
engagement understand the local and operating 
context 
Step 2: Identifying priority stakeholders and interlocutors 
Step 3: Establishing the necessary support system for 
meaningful stakeholder engagement 
Step 4: Designing appropriate and effective stakeholder 
engagement activities and processes 
Step 5: Ensuring follow-through 
Step 6: Monitoring and evaluating stakeholder 
engagement activities and responding to identified 
shortcomings 
Annex A. Monitoring and evaluation framework for 
meaningful stakeholder engagement 
Annex B. Engaging with indigenous peoples 
Annex C. Engaging with women 
Annex D. Engaging with workers and trade unions 
Annex E. Engaging with artisanal and small-scale miners 
The 2016 guidance on responsible supply chains has an 
‘objective ... to help companies respect human rights and 
avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral 
sourcing practices ...[and] is also intended to cultivate 
transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable 
corporate engagement in the mineral sector’ (XX, p3). The 
document is the third edition of the OECD’s guidance in this 
area. It sets out recommendations for those parties operating 
or using minerals from areas affected by conflict or with high 
risk of harm to people including ‘areas of political instability 
or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of 
civil infrastructure and widespread violence’ (XX, p13). The 
document details a risk-based due diligence framework, 
provides a model supply chain policy and has further detail 
regarding particular minerals and areas. Its contents include 
the following. 
Due Diligence Guidance  
What is due diligence in the mineral supply chain and why 
is it necessary? 
Who should carry out due diligence? 
Annex I. Five-Step Framework for Risk-Based Due 
Diligence in the Mineral Supply Chain 
Annex II. Model Supply Chain Policy for a Responsible 
Global Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas 
Annex III. Suggested Measures for Risk Mitigation and 
Indicators for Measuring Improvement 
Supplement on Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten 
Supplement on Gold 
I. Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines (2015) [22] 
The Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible 
Mineral Supply Chains are ‘guidance to all Chinese 
companies which are extracting and/or are using mineral 
resources and their related products ... to observe the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights during 
the entire life-cycle of the mining project’ ([22], 8). The 
document was adopted by the China Chamber of Commerce 
of Metals Minerals and Chemicals Importers & Exporters . 
The Guidelines requires these companies to have a risk-based, 
supply chain due diligence framework and, where there is risk 
in their supply chain, to act to reduce that ([22], p12-21). 
Significantly, this involves going beyond domestic law, with 
the Guidelines explicitly identifying risk as including: 
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 59
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‘Extracting or sourcing resources from land where the free, 
prior and informed consent of local communities … has not 
been obtained, including those for which the extractor holds 
a legal title, lease, concession, or license’ ([22], 5.2.1.4). 
The Chinese Guidelines cover all Chinese companies in 
the minerals supply chain – miners, as well as processors and 
uses of the processed product. The document contains no 
indication of its implementation or monitoring, and so its 
potential is unclear but potentially vast. If Chinese smelters 
are to be measured against these Guidelines, those businesses 
will want to ensure their raw product is coming from 
operations consistent with the Guidelines. This gives extra 
importance to the statement above about local community  
consent even where the miner already has the mineral rights 
and consent is not required under domestic law. The 
Guidelines’ content includes the following. 
I. Background and Challenges 
II. Objective 
III. Scope of Application 
IV. Introduction to Basic Steps of Risk-based Due 
Diligence 
V. Risk Categories for Due Diligence 
VI. Warning Signs 
VII. Framework and Processes for Due Diligence 
VIII. Audit, Certification and Oversight 
Annex: Model Supply Chain Policy 
J. Natural Resource Charter (2014) [23] 
This is the second edition of the Natural Resource Charter 
and describes 12 precepts on how a country and its 
government might transform extractive wealth into 
sustained prosperity, including citizens and the 
international community ([23], p4). The Charter was 
developed, through the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, by independent practitioners and academics 
experienced in the challenges faced by resource-rich countries 
and ‘was created in the belief that natural resource wealth can 
be a powerful tool for social and economic advancement, but 
only if countries are able to tackle the challenges ’ ([23], p4). 
The Charter contains the following 12 precepts, with 
additional detail and examples presented under each. 
1 Resource management should secure the greatest benefit for 
citizens through an inclusive and comprehensive national 
strategy, clear legal framework and competent institutions. 
2 Resource governance requires decision makers to be 
accountable to an informed public. 
3 The government should encourage efficient exploration and 
production operations, and allocate rights transparently. 
4 Tax regimes and contractual terms should enable the 
government to realize the full value of its resources 
consistent with attracting necessary investment, and should 
be robust to changing circumstances. 
5 The government should pursue opportunities for local 
benefits, and account for, mitigate and offset the 
environmental and social costs of resource extraction 
projects. 
6 Nationally owned companies should be accountable, with 
well-defined mandates and an objective of commercial 
efficiency. 
7 The government should invest revenues to achieve optimal 
and equitable outcomes, for current and future generations. 
8 The government should smooth domestic spending of 
revenues to account for revenue volatility. 
9 The government should use revenues as an opportunity to 
increase the efficiency of public spending at the national 
and sub-national levels. 
10 The government should facilitate private sector 
investments to diversify the economy and to engage in the 
extractive industry. 
11 Companies should commit to the highest environmental, 
social and human rights standards, and to sustainable 
development. 
12 Governments and international organizations should 
promote an upward harmonization of standards to support 
sustainable development. 
K. Local Good Deal: Achieving common prosperity (2014) 
[24] 
This policy brief proposes recommendations for local 
government leaders in ASEAN countries to ‘exploit new 
opportunities in ... ASEAN governance structures ... to 
ensure that the richness of natural resources leads to ... 
prosperity for ASEAN's citizens’ ([24], p1). A short (3 page) 
document, produced through the Asia Pacific Knowledge Hub 
for Better Governance on Extractive Industries, this describes 
the context and rationale for more focus on local government 
and need for these entities to increase cooperation throughout 
ASEAN. The document describes three recommendations. 
1. Ensure Local Governments and Communities get a Good 
Deal from Extractive Industry Activities.  
2. Equip Local Policy-makers with Capacity to Make Good 
Deals,  
3. Broaden and Up-Scale Transnational Engagement 
L. Mining and Sustainable Development Framework 
(2013) [25] 
The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining Minerals Metals 
and Sustainable Development (IGF) identifies as ‘the leading 
global intergovernmental policy forum on mining and 
sustainable development’, and this document is the latest 
version of its agreed framework on ‘Mining and Sustainable 
Development: managing one to advance the other’, which the 
IGF promotes and uses as ‘a call to the international  
community, particularly the UN and donor agencies, to 
enhance support towards capacity building that promotes  
the good governance of the mining/metals sector and its 
contribution to sustainability’ ([25], 5). The framework is 
presented under six areas: Legal and Policy Environment, 
Financial benefit maximization, Socio-economic benefit 
maximization, Environmental Management, Post-mining 
Transition, and Artisanal and Small-scale Mining. In relation 
to each, the Framework outlines both policy principles and 
then detailed ‘analysis’ about the issues arising and matters 
relevant to implementation. The IGF members adopted the 
Framework as ‘a comprehensive model that, progressively 
implemented, will allow mining to make its maximu m 
contribution to the sustainable development of developing 
countries’[25], 6. While Indonesia is not currently a member, the 
IGF includes many countries with large mining sectors and 
relevant experience (including Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, 
Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia and South Africa). 
The Framework is used by various parties to assess a country’s 
Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, volume 59
170
mining regulation and help identify areas for reform, 7  and so 
presents a useful tool. The Framework’s detail in relation to Legal 
and Policy Environment is extracted below. 
Legal and Policy Environment: A mature modern 
legislative regime is one that provides clear lines of 
responsibility and accountability. Such a regime provides 
the foundation of good governance and contributes to 
sustainable development in all aspects of social and 
economic life. To this end Governments should consider: 
The ongoing generation of and access to geological 
information 
... and making that information available to individuals, 
communities and other civil society actors with equal 
access to ensure that consultations between different parties 
can take place on an equal footing. 
The revision and periodic updating of mining codes and 
standards 
Mining codes and standards revised and updated to reflect 
changing knowledge and best practice. They should deal 
with all aspects of mining from exploration to closure and 
post-closure management. The data and reporting 
requirements by entities should be made explicit in 
exploration and operating licences so that authorities can 
make informed decisions. 
A permitting process that requires: 
Mining entities, in preparing their applications for a mining 
permit, to consult with communities and other stakeholders 
at all stages of the assessment and planning process and to 
document the nature and results of their engagement 
programme in the permit application; 
The submission of integrated social, economic and 
environmental assessments. In addition to a baseline 
description of current conditions, permit submissions 
should describe possible risks and impacts of the mining 
activities together with proposed mitigation or management 
measures; 
The permit submissions to identify and quantify opportunities 
and propose programmes that lead to the creation of 
sustainable benefits over the life of the project; 
The permit application to be considered complete only when 
it includes acceptable plans for the eventual closure of the 
mine and the provision of adequate financial assurance to 
cover the costs of closure and any ongoing monitoring; 
The permit applications, when applicable, to address 
indigenous peoples, cultural heritage, resettlement, and 
community safety and security issues; 
Mining entities to have a process of consultation that provides 
affected communities with an opportunity to express their 
views on project risks and impacts, and be consulted on the 
development of mitigation measures; and 
Completion of the process in a timely, transparent, 
unambiguous and consistent manner’ ([25], 6-7). 
M. Mineral & Energy Resource Exploration (2013) [26] 
Issued by the Australian Government’s Productivity 
Commission, this is a report of an ‘inquiry into the non-
financial barriers to mineral and energy resource 
exploration’. The document examines the Australian 
situation, and therefore is not directly applicable anywhere 
else. However it does have much of value beyond the 
Australian context, in the detailed analysis which the 
                                                                 
7
  The IGF Secretariat has worked with various governments in 
reviewing and recommending improvements in mining regulation 
Commission gives to the economic and legal dynamics around 
mining which arise in most countries: concepts of unnecessary 
regulatory burden, land access, heritage protection, 
environmental management, pre-competitive geoscience 
information, and workforce issues. While the specific 
recommendations identified by the Commission are aimed at 
Australian governments and stakeholders, the key points 
reflect issues and dilemmas which have broader resonance. 
Exploration is a very small part of the economy, but the 
‘sector’s significance is in discovering commercially 
valuable resources that sustain the operations of mineral 
and energy extraction industries — which represented’ 
nearly 10 percent of Australia’s GDP at that time. 
‘The number, size and quality of resource discoveries in 
Australia is declining over the longer term, and the 
exploration sector is experiencing rising costs and lower 
productivity. 
Governments regulate resource exploration for three broad 
reasons: 
 the mineral and energy resources are owned by the Crown 
[state] 
 exploration may impact on existing and future land uses 
such as agriculture, or damage sites of environmental and 
heritage significance 
 exploration may have effects beyond the area being 
explored, such as on the regional environment and nearby 
communities. 
Many stakeholders are dissatisfied with the current regulatory 
arrangements ... some explorers claim that governments are 
discouraging exploration ... some community groups claim 
that regulations are insufficient to protect [other]... values 
and ... uses of the land... 
Regulatory processes that impose unnecessary burdens on 
resource explorers or inhibit exploration can be reformed 
by: 
 ensuring stronger and simpler coordination, transparency 
and accountability of exploration licence approval 
processes 
 making land access decisions that take into account the 
benefits of exploration to the wider community, and that 
are appropriate to the level of risk posed by exploration as 
informed by sound evidence 
 improving access to the existing knowledge of Indigenous 
heritage and accrediting state and territory government 
processes which meet Australian Government standards 
of Indigenous heritage protection 
 addressing ... environmental approvals processes that are 
duplicative [between national and sub-national 
governments] and are not commensurate with the risk and 
significance of the environmental impacts of exploration. 
Explorers highly regard the accessibility and provision of pre-
competitive data by Australia’s geological survey 
organisations. However, the effectiveness of state and 
territory geological survey organisations is hampered 
because significant shares of their budgets are from short-
term funding initiatives’ ([26], p2). 
II. INDONESIA-SPECIFIC MATERIALS 
There have also been some recent publications 
summarising Indonesia’s mining regulation, or focussing on 
informed by the IGF Framework, including Mongolia, Suriname, 
Senegal and Uganda. 
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aspects of this. A similar literature review helps identify 
particular issues of attention. 
A. Beneficial Ownership in Indonesia (2018) [27] 
This policy brief outlines the international initiatives on 
increasing disclosure of beneficial ownership and Indonesian 
commitments and current structures relevant in this regard. It 
suggests that challenges to increasing disclosure on 
beneficial ownership in Indonesia extractives sector 
include governmental implementation, self-reporting and 
the lack of certainty around that, and data verification . 
The document, available in Bahasa Indonesia and English, 
contains sections detailing the Indonesia Commitment on 
Beneficial Ownership Disclosure, and Regulatory Framework 
of Beneficial Ownership Disclosure in Indonesia. 
B. Indonesia: Mining (2018) [28] 
The annual publication on Mining, by Getting The Deal 
Through, comprises summaries of mining law in numerous 
jurisdictions, usually compiled by commercial lawyers from 
each jurisdiction who advise mining companies and investors. 
The 2018 section on Indonesia states that ‘Given the recent 
massive changes to the mining regulations, new investors 
are likely to be cautious entering a business sector in which 
there is not a settled body of law, and which is likely to 
remain volatile’. The document contains succinct summaries 
of Indonesia’s principal laws and regulatory bodies that 
regulate the mining industry, state control & allocation of 
mineral rights and third-party rights in that process, 
information availability, and environmental and social aspects 
relevant to mining. 
C. Mining in Indonesia (2017) [29] 
This report’s foreword opines that ‘It is now more than 
eight years since the 2009 ...Mining Law was promulgated. 
...[T]here remain many challenges for investors ... These 
challenges include but are not limited to: ... protracted 
CoW/CCoW renegotiation process; Difficulties in dealing 
with the downstream in-country processing requirements  
under the Mining Law; Foreign shareholder divestment 
requirements; Lack of coordination between the central, 
provincial and regional governments; Conflicts between 
mining operations and forestry regulations; Community 
relations and labour regulations; and Corruption, 
collusion and nepotism’ ([29], 8). This report is a regular 
publication by the accountancy firm PwC and its focus and 
analysis is clearly informed by its title ‘Mining in Indonesia: 
Investment and Taxation Guide’. It is not offered as an 
objective or academic analysis  of the regulation of mining in 
Indonesia, but it does give detailed and reasoned insight into 
how investors and their advisers perceive the current situation. 
Thus it helps identify areas for attention in considering mining 
regulation in Indonesia. The report includes the following 
chapters. 
2.0 Regulatory Framework 
3.0 Contracts of Work 
4.0 Tax Regimes for the Indonesian Mining Sector 
5.0 Accounting Considerations 
                                                                 
8
  Summarised from [30], p21. 
9
  A survey of RIA in 'developing and transition countries' indicated that 
'it  seems that some form of RIA is used in the majority (75 per cent) of 
these countries. However, the coverage of RIA, both in terms of types 
6.0 Additional Regulatory Considerations for Mining 
Investment 
Appendices 
Appendix A Minimum in-country processing and refining 
requirements for metal minerals prior to export 
Appendix B Regional Taxes 
Appendix C Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources 
Appendix D Indonesian Mining Association & Indonesian 
Coal Mining Association 
Appendix E Summary of CCoW generations 
III. OTHER REGULATORY DYNAMICS 
There are some other materials and perspectives - beyond 
mining - which provide useful guidance for any analysis or 
recommendations about mining regulation in any jurisdiction. 
A. Regulatory Impact Assessment can help identify and 
implement improvements 
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is a process to 
systematically assess the benefits and costs of proposed 
changes to law. This is used in various jurisdictions, when 
amending or proposing new laws, to help regulators consider 
all the potential effects (both good and bad) of the proposed 
regulation, and to structure the regulation in a way most likely 
to achieve the desired objectives with the least unintended 
impacts. RIA can also help in analysing current regulation, 
and broadly involves four processes.8 
1 Explaining the regulatory context by: (i) identifying the 
policy objective(s) of the regulatory proposal; and (ii) 
describing the nature and extent of the 'problem' to be 
addressed by the regulatory proposal  
2 Explaining the proposal, detailing: (i) wording of the 
new/amended regulations, (ii) legal authority to make 
that regulation, (iii) groups likely to be affected by the 
regulation, and (iv) proposals for compliance.  
3 Undertaking cost-benefit analysis: (i) outline the 
benefits and costs expected from the regulatory proposal 
in relation to each of administrative, economic, social, 
environmental, enforcement and compliance; (ii) 
compare the proposal's costs and benefits in each of 
these areas, and also do the same for any practical 
alternatives to the proposal  
4 Describe the consultation and stakeholder involvement, 
including the above 3 steps 
RIA is an intensive process and its application is sporadic 
in under-resourced government agencies.9 Indonesia has had 
RIA initiatives for nearly two decades and, in 2009, the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidelines were launched by the 
Ministry of National Development Planning/National 
Development Planning Board. Recent academic assessment of 
these Guidelines reports RIA has not been used much, nor 
well, in Indonesia ([33], 106) but also identifies ways in which 
RIA and its benefits may better contribute to Indonesian 
regulation. 
‘(1) including RIA as a part of the education and training 
curriculum of leadership;  
(2) making RIA an alternative method in the formulation of 
policies;  
of regulation and number of regulation proposals included, appears to 
vary widely between countries. Few countries appear to be applying 
RIA consistently to regulatory proposals affecting economic, social 
and environmental policies': [31], p295; see also [32], p17. 
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(3) implementing socialization and continuous workshops 
on RIA in various government institutions both at the 
central and regional levels;  
(4) adopting the mindset of RIA, which is also called 
concise RIA and/or logic thinking RIA in formulating 
policies; and  
(5) restructuring the budget allocation in the preparation of 
the regional government policy so that RIA can be 
implemented in Indonesia’ ([33], p108). 
B. Dangers in insularity of mining regulation 
The separation of mining law, and mining regulators, from 
a country’s more general regulatory processes can be a 
double-edged sword. Yes, it enables greater specialisation and 
structuring to the particularities of mining operations, but it 
can also lead to insularity. Law Professsor Neil Gunningham 
focuses on safety in mining, but the observations in his 2007 
book also apply more widely. 
‘One consequence of this separation of mining from 
mainstream ... has been to isolate the industry from 
legislative and regulatory developments elsewhere. What 
became regarded as "next generation regulation" as regards 
OHS [occupational health & safety] generally, was largely 
ignored by the mining sector, its policy-makers and its 
regulators, who continued to adopt forms of regulation 
which "mainstream" regulators had long rejected as 
unlikely to reduce levels of work related injury and disease 
to anything approaching acceptable levels’ ([34], p12). 
C. Consistency with increasing structures around business 
responsibility 
There are increasing international standards and structures 
on the responsibility of business to respect human rights, 
which have relevance for government regulation of mining  
companies. 
In 2011, the UN agreed the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights [35] (known as the UNGPs)10 
which emphasise that business has a ‘responsibility to respect’ 
human rights, involving three basic aspects. These are that a 
company should: (1) adopt policies and procedures to respect 
human rights standards relevant to their operations, (2) 
conduct ‘due diligence’ so they are familiar with their 
operations and potential human rights impacts, and (3) remedy 
any impacts which their operations cause/contribute to, and 
‘use leverage’ to reduce impacts with which they are ‘directly 
linked’.11 The UNGPs have legal implications for companies 
in various ways,12 with their broadest application under the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises [38] (OECD 
Guidelines).  
The OECD Guidelines is a government and business 
agreed code of conduct for responsible business. This has 
                                                                 
10
  For a more detailed explanation of the origin and content of the 
UNGPs, see [36]. 
11
  [35], Guiding Principles 16 (policy commitment), 17 (due diligence) 
and 22 & 31 (remedy); all further explained in [37]. 
12
  These include: (1) companies expressly adopting the UNGPs and 
reporting against these requirements, (2) industry groups using 
processes from the UNGPs in their membership requirements, 
including the International Council on Mining and Metals, (3) 
governments and companies requiring contractors and suppliers to 
comply with the UNGPs; and (4) development banks and financiers 
using UNGP processes in their assessment or expectation of customer 
responsibilit ies. For greater detail on these developments, see [36], 
p892-896. 
established a complaints mechanism and government’s 
implementation bodies (termed ‘National Contact Points’) 
which can address any multinational company from an 
‘adhering country’, which includes many ‘home state’ 
countries of mining companies operating in Indonesia (eg. 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, USA). Any of these companies, if 
their Indonesian operations are considered contrary to the 
UNGPs, can be subject to mediation before their home-state 
‘national contact point’.13  The OECD Guidelines processes 
demonstrate companies’ operations being meas ured against 
international human rights standards even where the domestic 
law can have ‘set a lower bar’. 14  The OECD’s guidance 
documents about extractives due diligence and supply chains 
– outlined above in I(c) – are central in informing what is 
required for compliance with the OECD Guidelines ([20], 
p10). There have been cases where company compliance with 
domestic mining law has been found insufficient to meet the 
OECD Guidelines (eg. [40]), where companies have been 
adjudged inconsistent with the OECD Guidelines for failing 
investigate source regarding potential conflict minerals (eg. 
[41]), and where companies have been called on to use their 
leverage in government contracts to reduce the human rights 
impacts linked to their products or services (eg. [42], [43], 
[44]). 
D. Demanding perfection should not prevent improvement  
Effective law reform involves identifying and 
implementing what is achievable, and not detailing a 
‘shopping list’ of shortcomings and ideals in the face of 
limited resources to address these. This has been emphasised 
and explained in the work of the political scientist Dr Merilee 
Grindle and her ‘good enough governance’ concept. This 
shows that law reform must engage in some very difficult  
prioritising: 
‘Working toward good enough governance means accepting 
a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of 
institutions and government capabilities; being explicit 
about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good 
things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what’s 
working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; 
taking the role of government in poverty alleviation 
seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of 
each country’15 
Although Dr Grindle was specifically addressing good 
governance for development, these observations also have 
useful direction for any analysis or reform proposals in mining 
regulation. 
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
There is no place for an ignorant Australian to advocate 
‘copying what we do’. Nor - as Dr Grindle well explains - is 
13
  As yet there do not appear to be any complaints about mining 
operations in Indonesia but there have been various complaints and 
proceedings under the OECD Guidelines regarding other matters in 
Indonesia, including: land use in Tuban (East Java) for a cement 
factory (Swiss NCP); workforce of Coca-Cola Company (US National 
Contact Point); and human rights and environment issues of a Japanese 
multinational in the energy sector in Indonesia (Japanese Contact 
Point). 
14
  [38], Ch IV, [38]. A useful summary of the OECD Guidelines 
operation from 2001-2015 is provided in [39]. 
15
  [45], 525 (see more recent development of the concept in [46] & [47]). 
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there use in some generic ‘shopping list’ of everything 
necessary for ‘good’ mining regulation. Finally, as the Natural 
Resource Charter candidly acknowledges, resource 
development and regulation involves complex options and 
trade-offs. It would be simplistic to suggest there are 
universals which can be expressed in any detail to be useful to 
each jurisdiction. But the above analysis does provide some 
principles and areas which can assist in considering mining  
regulation in Indonesia. These can be relevant in range of 
contexts, such as: identifying issues which should be 
considered where a government decision-maker has a 
discretion to exercise, or proposals for law-reform. 
There seems much support for Indonesia’s historic 
‘contract of work’ mining regime, and much criticism of the 
current law and its implementation. Industry reference to 
structures and ‘ease’ of yesteryear is a recurrent theme in 
many jurisdictions; and comparison often does show that 
earlier times involved rights being allocated more easily and 
profits were bigger. But those times featured little control over 
environmental and social impacts of mining, and so no sober 
reflection reasonably expects such a system should be 
replicated today. Necessarily, therefore, the associated profits 
and ‘ease’ of rights-allocation which previously existed, are 
not a valid comparator. Governments and companies see the 
importance of greater accountability in mining regulation. 
This is the case in Indonesia, just as it is in other countries, and 
Indonesia’s 1998 changes around regional autonomy16 are one 
of many reasons why earlier contractual forms and practices 
cannot be replicated today.  
A. Local content and development 
There seems much contention around the legal structures 
seeking to increase local benefit in Indonesia, such as 
processing, employment, and ownership. When 
contemplating law reform or problems in implementation, it is 
often useful not to start with the legal structures. Too often, 
debates are sought to be fought and won with law alone. For 
example; companies demanding that a contract from a 
previous century must be strictly observed, or land owners 
insisting they have a legal right to veto development. Any 
structure which is legally established - but which makes little 
sense according to economics, politics, culture, public health 
or many other daily realities – usually faces a future of further 
legal arguments about breach and compliance. A more 
productive approach can be to seek better understanding 
between stakeholders in these other areas: economics, politics, 
culture, transparency, public health and so on. Only once 
broader processes with stakeholders have produced some 
consensus or compromise, then is it useful to turn to how the 
law might implement that. 
The ideas and structures of RIA can be useful, combined 
with much of the economic and governance ideas outlined in 
the international documents summarised earlier in this paper. 
If a stakeholder group is insisting on a certain position, they 
should be invited to consider the broader benefits and costs of 
that to all parties involved. These types of approaches can be 
seen in the detailed guidance of the three lengthy studies 
released earlier this year about open contracting, local content, 
and managing mining for sustainable development: [1], [2] & 
[4]. As regards local procurement, the 2017 reporting 
mechanism is relevant: [19].  These all have useful ideas and 
tools for stakeholders in seeking how to progress local content 
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  The relationship to mining regulation is described in [48], 5. 
arrangements with most likelihood of achieving desired 
results and gaining broad acceptance. 
B. Consistency with business & human rights 
As outlined earlier, there is increasing attention to the 
human rights impacts of business operations, and increasing 
structures under which these are being monitored. This can be 
directly in relation to the company, or through financiers and 
customers. These various pressures mean that mining 
companies will have reservations about mining law rights and 
procedures which involve significant human rights impacts . 
Useful guidance here can be drawn from the UN’s 2018 
sourcebook sections on ‘protecting the environment and 
people’, and the Natural Resource Charter and IGF’s Mining 
and Sustainable Development Framework  (all summarised in 
section I, above). RIA processes also suggest reference to 
relevant international standards, and a structure within which 
these can inform local regulation and implementation. 
C. Government’s governance 
Indonesia faces tremendous challenges, as the world’s 
fourth most-populous country, and governance across over 30 
provinces and thousands of islands. This is an additional 
complexity on top of the normal difficulties that most mining  
jurisdictions face, of seeking governmental efficiency 
between agencies. The benefits and impacts from mining  
operations invariably cross the responsibility of multiple 
government agencies. Most jurisdictions struggle with 
ensuring a consistency, and avoiding unnecessary duplication, 
between government agencies. Government officers, on 
whom implementation of any regulation will depend, are also 
a party whose interests should be considered in assessing or 
proposing changes to Indonesia’s mining regulation. 
Devolution from central government, if done too quickly and 
without capacity and support, can lead to inconsistent 
regulation of mining and misuse of funds. This is a problem 
which Indonesia appears to have encountered (eg.[49], p6; 
[33], p106) in common with other significant mining  
jurisdictions including Peru and Argentina.  
Again, RIA can provide assistance in considering these 
issues in mining; and the 2018 study on RIA in Indonesia 
identifies some useful guidance (see IIIA above). Greater 
accountability and transparency can assist in keeping 
interested parties informed of regulatory proposals, but also in 
making them aware (and encouraging their consideration) of 
broader interests which will also be affected by the particular 
regulation. The UN’s 2018 sourcebook has much of value in 
seeking to structure any regulation to better contribute to 
sustainable development (see IC above). The challenge is how 
to use this material in a way which gains domestic 
‘ownership’. This is reinforced by recent reflections on the use 
(and misuse!) of RIA.  
‘[T]he fundamental and inevitable difficulty its  [RIA] 
proponents face is that policy making is an inherently 
political process, one deeply embedded in liberal-
democratic systems of government. This is a difficulty, 
perhaps an insurmountable one, as the wishes of the 
electorate do not always coincide with the requirements of a 
rational, evidence-based decision-making process such as 
that at the core of prescribed RIA processes. ... It often 
takes a series of compromises between the competing 
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parties before agreement can be reached as to the content of 
a new or modified regulation.’ ([50], p120-121). 
Indonesia – like every other major mining jurisdiction - 
faces complexities with mining regulation for which there is 
no ‘easy answer’. As with other mining countries, domestic 
regulatory-making processes can be improved by better 
understanding and use of RIA and the array of recent, useful 
international guidance in the area. 
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